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Canzoneri and Diba (2004) show that the Taylor principle is not a panacea
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11 Introduction
The Taylor principle has become one of the pillars of modern normative analysis
of monetary policy. In a nutshell, it prescribes that the central bank should adjust
the nominal rate of interest more than one-for-one as a response to changes in the
in°ation rate. In the standard New Keynesian model, the Taylor principle alone
pins down the equilibrium in°ation rate. The validity of this prescription has been
challenged in the recent debate on the ¯scal determinants of in°ation.
The argument that the price level is determined by the degree of solvency of
the government suggests that the response of monetary policy to in°ation is an
insu±cient metric for nominal determinacy. Monetary and ¯scal policy should be
coordinated. In the ¯scal theory of price level determination proposed by Leeper
(1991), the Taylor principle should be coupled with a response of the tax rate to
changes in real debt of more than one-for-one to achieve a determinate in°ation rate.
One of the assumptions of Leeper (1991) is that government bonds play no direct
macroeconomic role. Canzoneri and Diba (2004) and Canzoneri et al. (2006) study
the interactions between monetary and ¯scal policy when bonds provide transaction
services for the purchase of consumption goods. This implies that there is a direct
channel for government bonds to a®ect the in°ation rate. Hence, the Taylor principle
need not hold any longer for determinate equilibria to exist.
The analysis of Canzoneri and Diba (2004) and Canzoneri et al. (2006) assumes
that real money balances play a key role. Not only does money enter the utility
function of households. Money and bonds are imperfect substitutes. Their aggre-
gation generates a measure of liquidity that facilitates the purchase of consumption
goods.
The role of monetary aggregates in New Keynesian models is the subject of a
recent debate. For instance, Woodford (2007) argues that the omission of a demand
for money is not at odds with the neutrality of money. Beyond these arguments,
we should stress that money demand creates an additional bu®er that a®ects the
relation the interest rate, consumption and in°ation. This raises the question of the
role played by money demand in the results of Canzoneri and Diba (2004).
In this paper, we follow Woodford (1998) and assume that the quantity of money
that facilitates transactions is negligible.1 On the other hand, we introduce two
types of bonds. One of them, which we call short-term bond, provides transaction
services. The other one, labelled long-term bond, does not a®ect the purchase of
consumption goods. We show that the results of Leeper (1991) hold also in our
framework. Moreover, the Taylor principle is still sacrosant, as it requires ¯scal
1This is also consistent with the presence of a `channel system' of control of interest rates that
allows an e±cient management of the aggregate quantity of money (see Woodford, 2002).
2policy to be passive in order to pin down the price level.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model econ-
omy, with a focus on the portfolio allocation problem of households. In section 3,
we discuss the equilibrium characteristics with explicit reference to the existence of
a de°ationary/in°ationary equilibrium path. In section 4, we describe the loglin-
earized version of the model. The calibration is presented in section 5. The results
on determinate equilibria are detailed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 A model with bond transaction costs
In this section we explore in a more detailed fashion the role of bonds as liquidity
providers in an economy without money. In what follows, we assume that there
are two categories of bonds. The ¯rst is a can be exchanged on the market at low
costs, and provides the transaction services that are assigned to money in a standard
monetary economy. The second type of bond is held in the households portfolio as
a store of value across periods.
2.1 Households
There is an in¯nite number of agents indexed on the real line between 0 and 1. Each














where Ct indicates the amount of consumption, and Lt the amount of labor e®ort
supplied by each single agent. In (1) ¯ indicates the discount factor, while ¾ denotes
the intertemporal substitution elasticity, the inverse of which is the coe±cient of
relative risk aversion.
We assume the existence of a large number of di®erentiated goods indexed over
the real line between 0 and 1. This allows each ¯rm to have a control of the price
of her ¯nal good to be sold, since output becomes demand determined. Following
the approach by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we assume that the consumption bundle
Cit demanded by each agent i 2 [0;1]is a CES type aggregate of all the j 2 [0;1]











where µ is the elasticity of substitution between di®erent varieties of goods produced
3by each ¯rm j. To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, the elasticity µ is
restricted to be bigger than one. Standard optimization problem for the choice of




















The aggregate price level Pt is beyond the control of each individual ¯rm.
When we aggregate Cit and ci
t (j) across all agents i; we obtain the aggregate
demand for ¯nal goods and for variety j given by Yt =
R 1




for all j 2 [0;1].
2.2 Portfolio choice








it¡1 + (1 + it¡1)Bit¡1
+ WitLit + Pt­
j
it ¡ PtCit (1 + Âg (Fit)) ¡ Tit (5)
The households allocates resources between two types of bonds, B¤
it and Bit. Bonds
B¤
it are standard in that they do not provide any type of transaction service. This
security pays an interest rate i¤
t¡1. Bonds Bit, can be used to purchase consumption
goods through the transaction technology f (Fit). The term Fit is the `velocity of





From (6) we observe that Fit plays the same role of the velocity of circulation of
money. In particular, the function g (Fit) is required to have the properties
g (Fit) = 0 for Fit · 0 (7)
g0 (Fit) > 0 and g00 (Fit) ¸ 0 (8)
Assumption (7) tells us that negative bond holdings do not provide any transaction
services. Assumption (8), instead, shows that the transaction cost function is in-
4creasing and convex in Fit. The convexity of g (Fit) is needed to make sure that the
utility maximization program delivers a true maximum.
Summing up, the term Âg (Fit) introduces transaction costs in terms of con-
sumption spending, with a constant scale parameter Â. Implicit in our formulation
there is the assumption that the economy under analysis possesses an almost per-
fect mechanism to shift funds from one checking account to another by changing the
portfolio composition of government bonds holdings.
Finally, from equation (5) we have that in addition to income derived from in-
vestment in bonds (it¡1Bt¡1 and i¤
t¡1B¤
t¡1), each agent derives funds from supplying
labor in quantity Lit, paid at the wage rate Wit. An additional source of income is
the participation to the pro¯t of j-th ¯rm producing the ¯nal good variety j, ­
j
it: A
lump sum tax denoted by Tit is levied on the income of the household.
2.3 Optimality conditions for households
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¸itBit = 0; ¸it ¸ 0 (13)
¸itB¤
it = 0; ¸it ¸ 0 (14)
In (9)-(14) ¸it indicates the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint (5). Equa-
tion (9) de¯nes the intertemporal choice of consumption, where the e®ects of ¯rst
order due to the transaction technology appear a critical element in the de¯nition of
intertemporal trade-o®s. Equation (10) de¯nes the optimal labor supply choice and
equates the disutility from work e®ort to the real wage weighted by the marginal
utility of consumption. Equation (11) indicates the optimal allocation of bonds
B¤
it¡1, while equation (12) represents the optimal allocation of bonds Bit. In partic-
ular, from equation (12) we observe that the presence of transaction costs generates
a wedge between left and right hand side.
52.4 A disgression on the transaction cost function for bonds







Function (15) ful¯lls all the requirements stated in (7) and (8) and allows a tractable
derivation of the equilibrium conditions. Therefore, using (15) into (9) and (12) and









where bit = Bit=Pt: It is immediate to verify that short term bond demand (16)
is (i) increasing with respect to it and Cit, and (ii) decreasing with respect to i¤
t.
In fact, if the return on short-term bonds rises, they become more attractive with
respect to long-term bonds. If consumption increases, then the demand for short
term bonds increases, because of the need to ¯nance a wider number of transactions.
Finally, if the return on long-term bonds i¤
t increases, the demand for Bit reduces.
Equation (16) is similar to a traditional money demand function with money instead
of short-term bonds. It should be pointed out that equation (16) is de¯ned only for
a positive spread between the rates.
The imperfect substitutability existing between the two types of bonds is already
re°ected into the transaction role attached to the quantities of short-term bonds.
However, in order to obtain simple closed-form solutions, we assume that the rate
of returns on long-term bonds follows a close relationship with the rate of return on
short-term bonds. In particular, we assume that the relationship existing between
the rate of returns of the two types of bonds is
i¤
t = ³tit (17)
where ³t is a stochastic term representing the comovements existing between the
long rate i¤
t and the short term rate it. The term ³t can be represented according to
the stochastic process
log³t = (1 ¡ ½³)³ + ½³ log³t¡1 + "³t (18)






, and the autoregressive coe±cient ½³ is assumed to be less
than one.
62.5 The production side
Staggered pricing arises from menu costs along the lines of Rotemberg (1982). Under












where ¼ is the steady state of the in°ation rate and Áp is the parameter of the
adjustment cost function AC
p
t that determines the level of price rigidity existing in
the model. Under (19) a ¯rm pays a cost in terms of output Yt each time the price
level of her ¯nal goods di®ers from steady state in°ation rate ¼.
The production function of each variety j is
Yt (j) = AtL®
t (j) (20)
According to (20) each ¯rm employs a given quantity of labor Lt (j) in the production
of j-variety. Note that all ¯rms producing j varieties are subject to a technology
shock At
logAt = (1 ¡ ½A)A + ½A logAt¡1 + "At (21)
Where ½A < 1 and "At is an i.i.d. random variable, normally distributed with zero
mean and variance ¾2
a:
Each individual ¯rm faces a downward demand curve of the same demand (3),
with Yt (j) in place of Cit and chooses the optimal quantity of labor input Lt (j) by



















subject to the demand function (3), to the production function (20) and to the price
adjustment cost function (19). Note that in (22) ½t is a stochastic pricing kernel
for contingent claims employed by ¯rms to discount future pro¯t stream. Thus, the



















































In (47)-(24), Ãt (j) can be interpreted as the output demand elasticity augmented
by cost of price adjustment weighted by the stochastic pricing kernel ½t. In steady
state, if
Pt(j)
Pt¡1(j) = ¼ for all t and j, we get that Ãt (j) = µ. The markup for each ¯rm








In steady state, the markup is µ
µ¡1, so that when µ ! 1; ¹ ! 1. With perfectly
°exible prices with Áp = 0 the markup is once again µ
µ¡1.
2.6 Fiscal policy
The government budget constraint can be written as
Bt + B¤






t¡1 + Gt ¡ Tt (26)
In (26) the primary de¯cit (surplus) Gt¡Tt plus interest rate proceedings paid by the
government to the owner of government debt (both short and long debt) it¡1Bt¡1,
i¤
t¡1B¤
t¡1, are ¯nanced by issuing new debt, namely Bt ¡ Bt¡1, B¤
t ¡ B¤
t¡1.
The equilibrium condition for government bonds suggests that the demand equals















We assume the existence of a ¯scal policy rule that sets the level of taxes in reaction
to the outstanding level of real debt








We should remark that, in this model, the demand for short term debt is a function of
8the nominal interest rate, the current output and the demand conditions in the goods
market, as clari¯ed by equation (16). Therefore, the type of debt that constrains
the government's behavior is the long term debt. The parameter Ã1 re°ects the
solvency condition of the government, and measures the reaction of ¯scal policy to
the level of long term debt. A ¯scal policy that follows rule (30) is entirely de¯ned
according to the size of parameter Ã1. Thus, according to Leeper (1991),
De¯nition 1 Fiscal policy is passive if
¯ ¯¯¡1 ¡ Ã1
¯ ¯ < 1; (31)
and active otherwise.
Condition (31) de¯nes the size of parameter Ã1 to be satis¯ed in order to get a
non-explosive path for debt.
Finally, public expenditure Gt is exogenous according to
logGt = (1 ¡ ½G)G + ½G logGt¡1 + "Gt (32)













The nominal short-term interest rate it reacts to in°ation ¼t and output gap xt with
intensities captured by the coe±cients Á¼ and Áx.
3 Aggregate equilibrium
An important aspect for a full characterization of the equilibrium is represented by
the role of intertemporal discount factor of both ¯rms and consumers. We assume
that each agent has access to a set of complete market for contingent claims. The
direct implication of this assumption is that the discount factor of households should







9For the intuition behind condition (34) it is enough to imagine the presence of a
representative agent who can freely exchange shares of each ¯rm, without paying
any transaction cost.
Next, in order to reduce the model we can concentrate around a symmetric
equilibrium where the choices made by each agent j are the same across all agents.
This way, we can assume that Xit (j) = Xt for all i and j. Therefore, by combining
the First Order conditions on consumption and labor (9)-(10) together with (15),












From equation (35) it is not di±cult to show that labor supply function is increasing
with respect to real wage, but decreasing with respect to consumption. After making



















From (36) we observe that the amount of income available for consumption is ob-
tained net of resources employed for making transactions and public expenditure.
An important feature considered in the present model derives from the speci¯c func-
tional form assumed for the transaction costs function (15). In fact, from Euler


























Therefore, since ¸t is a monotone decreasing function of Ft, there are at least two
positive steady state satisfying (37). The ¯rst is such that ¸ = 0 with F = 1. The
second takes the form
(1 + i)¯
¼
= 1 ¡ ÂF3 (39)
There might be no solution to equation (39). This occurs if (1 + i)¯ > ¼. If
we assume that (1 + i)¯ < ¼, we immediately get that equation (37) becomes a
di®erence equation, with a converging solution.
103.1 A constraint on bond velocity
Here we brie°y sketch an argument in order to exclude that the `bond velocity' term
F grows arbitrarily without bound with positive probability. Let F be the unique
solution to (39). If we have an o®-equilibrium path value for Ft such that Ft > F
or ¯ < ¼, then from equation (37) we ¯nd that
Et [¸t+1] < ©¸t (40)
for a given ©, such that 0 < © < 1. Therefore, given the information available at
time t condensed by the information set It, the probability that ¸t+1 is lower than
¸t is positive, given equation (40), i.e.
P [¸t+1 < ©¸t j It] > 0 (41)
Applying (41) recursively, we get
P [¸t+s < ©s¸t j It] > 0 (42)
Equation (41) together with the transaction technology function puts an upper
bound on F. This allows to exclude any path for ¸t that require F growing with
positive probability. To sum up, if Ft > F for all t, then ¸t must have a positive
probability of growing arbitrarily close to zero as t ! 1. However, this would imply
a non-zero probability of arbitrarily large values of Ft. Therefore, Ft > F is impos-
sible on an equilibrium path. By a similar argument, if ¯ > ¼, we have a positive
probability of getting an arbitrarily large large value of F, which is inconsistent with
an equilibrium positive level of short-term debt.
From the same argument, if Ft < F and ¯ > ¼ for some t, we have that there
is a non-zero probability that ¸t+s becomes arbitrarily large, so Ft assumes values
arbitrarily close to zero, as t ! 1. Again, this is inconsistent with the equilibrium
path, because it violates the transversality condition. Again, we must conclude that
the value for F that solves (39) is an equilibrium value.
4 Loglinearized model
The next step consists in reducing the model into a three equations system an
intertemporal version of the IS equation, the aggregate supply equation (AS, hence-
forth) and the government budget constraint. In order to derive the reduced form
system, we take a log-linear approximation around the steady state. In what follows,
each variable Xt is approximated around the steady state by using the formula. Via
11recursive substitution, we obtain log-linearized version of the resource constraint
e Ct =
e Yt
Sc (1 + ÂF2)
¡
g
Sc (1 + ÂF2)
e Gt ¡
2ScÂF3b³
Sc (1 + ÂF2)
e ³t +
2ScÂF2bi
Sc (1 + ÂF2)
e it (43)
where the coe±cients b³, bi, are reported in Appendix A.
We then log-linearize the ¯rst-order conditions (9) and (10), eliminate e Ct from
both equation, by making use of (43). Next, we can eliminate e Lt from the log-
linearized version of the production function to obtain
e ¸t = ´ye Yt ¡ ´g e Gt + ´a e At + ´³e ³t + ´ie it (44)
with the coe±cients ´y;´g;´a;´³;´i.
Finally, from equation (equation (11)), we obtain the intertemporal IS equation
e Yt+1¡¸g e Gt+1+¸a e At+1+¸³e ³t+1+¸ie it+1¡¸¼e ¼t+1 = e Yt¡¸g e Gt+¸a e At+°³e ³t+°ie it (45)
where the coe±cients are de¯ned as ¸g = ´g=´y, ¸a = ´a=´y, ¸³ = ´³=´y, ¸i = ´i=´y,
°³ = (´³ ¡ ®i)´¡1
y , ¸¼ = ´¡1
y . Equation (45) is the intertemporal IS equation
discussed by McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
The new feature of equation (45) is the presence of the nominal interest rate dated
at time t+1,e it+1, together with the interest rate dated at time t,e it. The presence of
e it+1 is due to the characteristics of the transaction technologies F and B considered
in the model.
The derivation of the aggregate supply equation starts from the log-linearization
of the elasticity Ãt, which takes the form
e Ãt = Ápe ¼t ¡ ¯Ápe ¼t+1 (46)
To simplify the algebra, we assume that the steady state of the in°ation rate has
been set equal to 1. From the ¯rst order condition with respect to L we have that
f Wt = e Yt ¡ e Lt + (µ ¡ 1)
¡1 Ápe ¼t ¡ (µ ¡ 1)
¡1 ¯Ápe ¼t+1 (47)
Moreover, from the production function e Lt = ®¡1
³
e Yt ¡ e At
´
. To get an useful
expression of the AS equation, we can substitute out into the log-linearized version
of (10), the equation (47) for f Wt, equation (44) for e ¸t, equation (43) for e Ct, and e Lt.
After rearrangement, we ¯nd
¯Ete ¼t+1 = e ¼t ¡ ¹ye Yt + ¹g e Gt + ¹³e ³t + ¹A e At + ¹ie it (48)
12where the coe±cients ¹y; ¹g; ¹A; ¹³; ¹i are reported in Appendix A.
The model is expressed as a function of the output gap Xt de¯ned (in log-linear
terms) as e Xt = e Yt¡e Y
p
t , where e Y
p
t is the level of potential output (or full employment













Therefore, the aggregate supply equation can be written as
¯Ete ¼t+1 = e ¼t ¡ ¹y e Xt + ¹ie it (50)
By the same argument, we can rewrite the IS equation by using the de¯nition of
output gap (49), to get
e Xt+1 + ¸ie it+1 ¡ ¸¼e ¼t+1 = e Xt + °ie it + Rn
t (51)
where Rn










e At ¡ e At+1
´




t de¯ned in (52) indicates the natural rate of interest from the value
of the real interest rate consistent with a full employment equilibrium and a zero
in°ation rate.
We should stress that, di®erently what is proposed in the literature, the aggregate
supply curve (50) includes the nominal interest rate e it. The presence of e it is due to
the relationship existing between the level of real debt bt and the nominal interest
rate that originates from the direct dependence of the Lagrange multiplier from
nominal rate it.
Since the present model considers the issue of price level determination on the
basis of ¯scal solvency, a key equation of the above system is the government budget
constraint. In order to make the system entirely de¯ned by four variables (in°ation
rate, output gap, interest rate and short-term real debt), we can now derive the
semi-reduced form of the government budget constraint
°y e Xt +e b¤




t¡1 + µie it¡1 + µy e Xt¡1 + R2t (53)




















e ³t¡1 ¡ °³e ³t (54)
with all the coe±cients reported in Appendix A.
Summing up, the system is made of three equations that are function of the
nominal interest rate. After substituting out the reaction function of the central
bank, we get a model in three equations and three unknowns ¼t; Xt and bt.2
5 Calibration
In order to characterize the bounds for the monetary policy parameters, we provide
a set of values for the `core' parameters of the model, obtained according to a cali-
bration procedure on the basis of quarterly observations drawn for the US economy
over the sample 1959:1-2007:4. The calibrated values for the non-policy parameters
are reported in Table 1.
The level of the discount factor delivers a value for the real interest rate (in gross
terms) equal to 1.003 per quarter, which is consistent with the empirical observations
on US economy. The nominal interest rate has been set equal to 1.6 per cent per
quarter, as recovered from sample observations. In order to simplify algebra, the
long run in°ation rate (in gross terms) has been set equal to 1.
The share of consumption in GDP at the steady state is assumed to be 0.57.
The value of Â has been set to match a level of transaction costs equal to 2 per
cent per year. The elasticity of substitution ° between consumption and leisure is
set to 0.76, in order to match the long-run ratio of market to non-market activities
L
1¡L = 0:2243 suggested by Christiano (1991).
The elasticity of substitution between di®erent goods variety µ has been set to
be equal to 10, implying a mark up equal to 1.1, as it is customary in the current
literature. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (the inverse of risk aversion
coe±cient) ¾ has been set to be 0.1. The estimated values tend is close to 0.08.
The parameter ® indicates the share of consumption in the production process as
proposed by the large part of the real business cycle literature. Finally the parameter
Á0 in the ¯scal policy reaction function has been set to match the steady state ratio
of debt to GDP equal to 0.44. The parameter Ã1 describing the maginal the reaction
of taxes to real debt is set to a benchmark value of 0.05, which lies within the range
2In what follows, we drop the tilde sign from each variable. Hence all the variables are expressed
in log-linear deviations from the steady state.
14established by inequality (31). We calibrate the parameter A to match the post-
World War II level of output of the U.S. economy.
The parameters of the stochastic side of the model are reported in Table 2. The
values for ½A and ¾2
A are from Kim (2000), while the values for ½G and ¾2
G are from
Schmitt - Groh¶ e and Uribe (2002). For what concerns the value of the parameters of
the equation (18). The steady state value for ³t has been obtained from the average
spread existing between a one-month Treasury Bill and the 10-year government
bonds for the US economy. From the dataset, we have ³t = 0:24 on average over the
all sample. We estimate equation (18) and obtain ½³ and ¾2
³ = :00196.3
6 Determinacy of a REE
In this section we analyze the determinacy conditions for two speci¯cations of the
central bank's reaction function, namely the cases of pure in°ation targeting and
standard Taylor rule.
6.1 Targeting current in°ation
Here we consider the loglinearized interest rate rule
it = Á¼¼t (55)
According to (55), monetary authority targets only the current in°ation rate. A
rule like (55) is a very simple representation of the pure in°ation target regime,
and it represents a good approximation of the European Central Bank operating
procedures. After plugging rule (55) in the system (50)-(53) and rearranging, we
get a three-equation system in ¼t; Xt, bt that can be represented in matrix framework
as follows4
AZt+1 = BZt (56)












3Equation (18) has been estimated by instrumental variables, with four lags of ³t as instruments.
4Note that from equation (51) and (53) we left out the term R
n
t and R2t since they do not a®ect















1 + ¹iÁ¼ ¡¹x 0
°iÁ¼ 1 0




with a1 ´ °iÁ¼ + °¼, b2 ´ °iÁx + °y, b3 ´ µiÁx + µy: By inverting matrix A and
multiplying matrix B by A¡1, the system can be cast in the form






¯¡1 (1 + ¹iÁ¼) ¡¯¹x 0
°21 °22 0




where the terms °21, °22;°31, °32 in (61) are de¯ned as
°21 = ¯¡1 (1 + ¹iÁ¼)(¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼) + °iÁ¼
°22 = 1 ¡ ¯¡1 (¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)
°31 = [°y (¸iÁ¼ ¡ ¸¼) ¡ °i](1 + ¹iÁ¼) + b3 ¡ a1°iÁ¼
From (61) we immediately observe that the structure of the system is block-
triangular. Therefore, to study determinacy we can restrict our attention to the
2 £ 2 submatrix ¢2£2
¢ =
"




To get determinacy for the full system we require that two eigenvalues of the sys-
tem be outside the unit circle and one inside, since public debt is a predetermined
variable. This allows a richer con¯guration of determinacy conditions rather than
in cases without an explicit role of the government budget constraint.
The conditions for determinacy are
Proposition 2 Let Á¼ > 0. Under contemporaneous pure in°ation targeting rule,
necessary and su±cient conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to be de-
terminate are that (a) either
Á¼ > Á¼1 and ¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1 (63)
16(b) or




Proof 1 See Appendix C. ¥
According to Leeper's (1991) terminology, condition (63) identi¯es a combina-
tion of active monetary and passive ¯scal policy, while condition (64) identi¯es a
combination of passive monetary and active ¯scal. In the Leeper's sense, an active
monetary policy is de¯ned when monetary authority sets nominal interest rate (or
money supply) in order to keep under control the in°ation rate. A passive monetary
policy is when, instead, the interest rate (or money supply) are left free to adjust. In
the recent monetary policy literature, condition (64) is identi¯ed with a combination
of active ¯scal policy and passive monetary policy. In particular, if Á¼ > Á¼1 and
Ã1 < ¯¡1 ¡1, Ã1 > ¯¡1 +1, we have three roots inside the unit circle. In this case,
we have three converging roots and a continuum of solution. In this case the price
level is converging, but indeterminate.
6.2 Taylor rule
After log-linearizing the Taylor rule around the steady state, we obtain the reaction
function
it = Á¼¼t + ÁxXt (65)
Rule (65) is the standard Taylor rule proposed by Taylor (1993, 1999). According
to (65), nominal interest rate reacts contemporaneously with respect to current
in°ation and output gap. After inserting (65) into (50) and (51) and rearranging we
















¯¡1 (1 + ¹iÁ¼) ¯ (¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) 0
®21 ®22 0






(¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)(1 + ¹iÁ¼)






(¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)(¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) + ¯ (1 + °iÁ¼)
¯ (1 + ¸iÁx)
(69)
b31 =
(°y + °iÁx)(¸iÁ¼ ¡ ¸¼)









®31 = b31 (1 + ¹iÁ¼) + b32°iÁ¼ + µiÁ¼ (72)
®32 = b31 (¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) + b32 (1 + °iÁ¼) + µy + µiÁx: (73)
Proposition 3 Given Á¼ > 0, Áx > 0. For a model with contemporaneous in°ation
and output targeting interest rules, necessary and su±cient conditions for a REE to
be determinate are that
(i) either
Á
¼ < Á¼ < Á¼ and ¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1 (74)
(ii) or
Á¼ < Á
¼ and Ã1 < ¯¡1 ¡ 1; Ã1 > ¯¡1 + 1 (75)
where
Á¼ =




¹x (1 + ¸¼) ¡ 2(1 + ¯) ¡ Áx (¸i + ¸¼¹i + °i (1 + ¯))
2¹i + ¸i¹x
Proof 2 See Appendix D. ¥
Even in this case we can con¯rm the same results discussed in the previous case
with a pure in°ation targeting rule. From condition (74) we have that a combination
of active-monetary with passive -¯scal delivers a fully determinate equilibrium. Since
matrix ¡ is once again lower triangular to guarantee a determinate REE we need
to have two roots outside the unit circle. Because of the format of matrix ¡, the
requirement of active monetary policy can be violated, but the equilibrium is still
determinate if ¯scal policy is properly set to keep the price level determinate.
The nature of the bounds determined by (74) and (75) is more complex than
in the pure in°ation targeting case. This is because the upper and lower limits for
the in°ation targeting parameter Á¼ are now a function of the output gap targeting
parameter Áx. According to the benchmark parameter values highlighted in Table
1, we get that the relationship existing between Á¼ and Áx is increasing, as repre-
sented in Figure 1. This ¯gure has been obtained by varying Áx 2 [0;2]. In order
18to keep the equilibrium determinate, under a standard Taylor rule, the in°ation
targeting parameter must increase as Áx raises. Thus, determinacy is reached only
for combination of parameters lying on the line or on above the line that separates
the two region where we get either determinacy or indeterminacy. The intuition
behind this result is related to the logic underlying the Taylor principle. The in-
°ation targeting parameter should be set to be bigger than one, and the relative
magnitude between Á¼ and Áx must be kept constant as Áx raises. Of course, all
these considerations hold if a monetary policy rule is associated with a ¯scal policy
rule that sets the primary surplus as a function of real debt under the conditions
established by (74). When, instead the conditions are given by (75), the regions with
determinacy/indeterminacy is reversed, with respect to what has been represented
in Figure 1. In this last case, monetary policy need not be active provided that ¯scal
policy is set according to (75).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we discuss the determinacy of the price level in a cashless environment.
We present a model with two types of government bonds, a short-term bond that is
used for the purchase of consumption goods, and a long-term bond that is used as
a store of value. If ¯scal policy is designed according to the prescriptions of ¯scal
theory of the price level of Leeper (1991), determinacy is achieved by following the
Taylor principle. In order to pin down the price level, ¯scal policy should be passive
in the sense of Leeper (1991). These ¯ndings stand in stark contrast with those
of Canzoneri and Diba (2004) and Canzoneri et al. (2006), who use a model with
liquidity services from money and bonds to suggest that the Taylor principle is not
a panacea for determinacy.
A number of additional questions of interest are raised in our paper. Our re-
sults suggest that the introduction of a sophisticated demand for money a®ects the
determinacy properties of simple rules for monetary policy, rather than the macroe-
conomic role per se played by government bonds. It this sense it would be important
to understand whether di®erent modelling assumptions about money matter for the
determinacy properties. Finally, the introduction of distortionary taxation adds a
new transmission channel that can change the results greatly.
19A Coe±cients of the reduced-form model
b³ =
³i
3ÂF3 (1 + ³i)
(76)
bi =
i(1 ¡ ³) + ³i2
3ÂF3 (1 + ³i)
2 (77)
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b(1 + i ¡ Ã2)
b¤Sc (1 + ÂF2)
; µg =
b[Ã2 ¡ (1 + i)g]
b¤Sc (1 + ÂF2)
B Schur-Cohn criterion
The characteristic equation of a 2£2 matrix A is x2¡tr(A)x+det(A) = 0. It is well
known that the condition for two roots of the characteristic equation to lie outside
the unit circle is (see LaSalle, 1986)
jdet(A)j > 1; (78)
jtr(A)j < 1 + det(A): (79)
In particular, condition (79) can be split up in the two inequalities
1 + det(A) + tr(A) > 0 (80)
1 + det(A) ¡ tr(A) > 0 (81)
C Proof of proposition 2
















From condition (78) of the Schur-Cohn criterion, it is certainly true that det(¢) >





21On the other hand, condition (80) directly implies
Á¼ >
¹x¸¼ ¡ 2(1 + ¯)
[2¹i + ¹x (°i + ¸i)]
(83)
while (81)
Á¼ (1 + °i ¡ ¸i) > 0 (84)
which is always satis¯ed since we set Á¼ > 0. By using the benchmark parameter
values considered in the model, it is immediate to verify that the bound established
by (83) is bigger than that speci¯ed by (82), under a wide range of the core pa-
rameter values. Therefore, condition (83) is both necessary and su±cient to ensure
determinacy. For the system condensed in matrix ¡ we require that the third root be
inside the unit circle. This is true if condition (31) is respected, which is equivalent
to require that
¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1 (85)
When both conditions (83) and (85) are satis¯ed, then all the three roots of the
system are inside the unit circle, and the equilibrium is unique. ¥
D Proof of proposition 3
Once again, given the triangular structure of matrix we can concentrate on the
eigenvalues of the submatrix ¡2£2
11 and that of ¡1£1
22 , in (66)-(67).
The trace and the determinant of submatrix ¡2£2
11 are given, respectively, by
tr(¡11) =
(1 + ¹iÁ¼)(1 + ¸iÁx) + (¸¼ ¡ ¸iÁ¼)(¹iÁx ¡ ¹x) + ¯ (1 + °iÁx)
¯ (1 + ¸iÁx)
det(¡11) =
¹iÁ¼ + 1 + °iÁx ¡ ¹x
¯ (1 + ¸iÁx)
The condition det(¢) > 1 implies
Á¼ >
¹x ¡ (1 ¡ ¯) ¡ (°i ¡ ¯¸i)Áx
¹i
(86)
On the other hand, from condition (80) we get
Á¼ >
¹x (1 + ¸¼) ¡ 2(1 + ¯) ¡ Áx (¸i + ¸¼¹i + °i (1 + ¯))
2¹i + ¸i¹x
(87)
22Finally, from (81) we ¯nd the constraint
Á¼ <
1 ¡ ¯ + (¸¼ ¡ 1)¹x + Áx (°i ¡ ¸i ¡ ¸¼¹i ¡ ¯°i)
¸i¹i
(88)
According to benchmark parameter values in the calibration section, we immediately
get that the only constraints that bind are (87) and (88). In fact, the bound is
determined by (86) is equal to 1.6233, while (87) is equal to 1.74. Therefore, if
(87) is satis¯ed, so is (86). Finally, the bound in (88) is equal to 153.9. Given the
standard values for Á¼ this is always satis¯ed5.
Conditions (87)-(88) imply that two eigenvalues of matrix ¡ are outside the unit
circle. This is enough to establish the determinacy of the REE induced by rule
(65). Thus, the third root given by the determinant of ¡1£1
22 should lie inside the
unit circle. This is equivalent to require that condition (31) be veri¯ed, or that
¯¡1 ¡ 1 < Ã1 < ¯¡1 + 1; that generates condition (74).
If one of the constraints (87)-(88) is not satis¯ed, then the submatrix ¡11 has one
root inside and one outside the unit circle. To restore determinacy we need another
root outside the unit circle. This can be obtained by setting
¯ ¯¯¡1 ¡ Ã1
¯ ¯ > 1, or
Ã1 < ¯¡1 ¡ 1; Ã1 > ¯¡1 + 1. ¥
5Note that for the simulation it has been assumed a value for Áx equal to 0.5, as the benchmark
values proposed by Taylor (1999).
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25Table 1: Non-Policy Parameters
¯ Â ° µ ¾ Ã0 Ã1 ®
0.997 0.22 0.76 10 0.1 8.31 0.05 0.77
26Table 2: Calibration of shocks
Parameter ½A ½³ ½G





Value 0.0003 0.00196 0.000126
27Figure 1: Determinacy regions with Taylor-type rule
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